under art. 3(f) of the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, to list the questions to be posed and had submitted the list as an exhaustive account of the proposed examination, it could not now extend that list by seeking cross-examination of the witnesses upon their answers.
Held, making the following order:
(1) The witnesses’ objections to the request as presently formulated were well-founded. The speculative or “fishing” nature of parts of the request related both to the production of documents and the giving of oral evidence. The court had a discretion to adopt a “blue pencil” approach to its order for compliance, allowing the request in part by amending the offending references and clarifying them in as few words as possible. It could not, however, restructure or recast the request so that it became different in substance from the original. In accordance with s.2(4) of the Schedule to the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) (Cayman Islands) Order 1978, those questions calling for specified and unspecified documents (
e.g. minutes of board meetings) to be produced would be redacted to require only the former. Other questions of an open-ended nature, seeking to elicit evidence leading to new avenues of enquiry, relating to matters not mentioned in the Norwegian proceedings, or requiring detailed evidence of events many years ago to be given from memory, would be deleted or curtailed to remove the potential for abuse (
page 85, line 26 – page 86, line 35).
(2) Furthermore, no additional questions following on from those specified in the request would be permitted. Article 3(
f) of the Hague Convention required the requesting court to elect whether to list the actual questions or the subject-matter upon which examination would take place, and having elected to submit a comprehensive list and stated as much in the request, the Norwegian court would not be permitted effectively to alter the format by seeking wide-ranging examination and cross-examination of the witnesses. Such a fundamental change would require a new request to be issued (
page 86, line 38 – page 88, line 3).
Legislation construed:
Grand Court Rules, O.39, r.8(1):
“Subject to any directions contained in the order for examination—
(a) any person ordered to be examined before the examiner may be cross-examined and re-examined; and
(b) the examination, cross-examination and re-examination of
persons before the examiner shall be conducted in like manner as at the trial of a cause or matter.”
Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) (Cayman Islands) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1890), Schedule, s.2(4):
“An order under this section shall not require a person—
(a) to state what documents relevant to the proceedings to which the application for the order relates are or have been in his possession, custody or power; or
(b) to produce any documents other than particular documents specified in the order as being documents appearing to the court making the order to be, or to be likely to be, in his possession, custody or power.”
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (The Hague, March 18th, 1970; UK Treaty Series 20 (1977), Cmnd. 6727), art. 3(
f): The relevant terms of this paragraph are set out at
page 87, lines 33–37.
D.T. McGrath for the applicants;
A. McN. McLaughlin for the estate of Anders Jahre;
A.J.E. Foster for the trustees of the Aall Foundation and Robert Slatter;
J.P. Walton for the Compass Trust (representing the estate of the settlor of the Continental Foundation and the Aall Foundation);
W.J. Helfrecht as a witness and for the Attorney General (but not as amicus curiae) on matters relating to the Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law.
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SMELLIE, C.J.: Before me is a letter of request from the court of |
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Drammen, Norway. The request seeks the taking of evidence by way of |
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depositions from the witnesses, Mr. William Helfrecht and Mr. Robert |
30 |
Slatter. |
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|
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Background |
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The circumstances of the case in Norway are described in the request |
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in brief. The action in question is an action for damages brought by |
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Anders Jahre’s estate against the defendants. The action also includes a |
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claim brought by Anders Jahre’s estate against Lazard Brothers & Co. |
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Ltd. concerning the transfer of 16¼% of all the shares issued in Bulls |
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Tankrederi A.S. The plaintiff alleges that Anders Jahre, prior to his death |
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in 1982, had built up a considerable fortune outside Norway. It is also |
40 |
alleged that, at the time of Anders Jahre’s death, the greater part of his |
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foreign assets were in the Panama-registered Continental Trust Co. Inc., |
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formerly Pankos Operating Co. S.A. These facts are contested by the |
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defendants. |
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In 1976 a foundation was established in The Bahamas for the purpose |
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of owning the shares in Continental Trust Co. Inc. 80% of the shares in |
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Continental Trust Co. Inc. were transferred to the Continental |
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Foundation. The remaining 20% of the shares were transferred to another |
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shareholder. |
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One of the main submissions in the case put forward by Anders Jahre’s |
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estate is that the establishment of the Continental Foundation was based |
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on funds owned by Anders Jahre, but that this did not entail a genuine |
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transfer of the assets in Continental Trust Co. Inc. to the Foundation. It is |
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therefore maintained that the assets belong to Anders Jahre’s estate and, |
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to the extent that they have been used up since 1976, they must be made |
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good by the defendants. |
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The background to this is that Anders Jahre’s estate asserts that the |
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assets were wholly or partly used up as a consequence of acts and/or |
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omissions on the part of the defendants, rendering them liable in damages |
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because, according to Anders Jahre’s estate, they were exercising |
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supervisory and control functions in respect of Anders Jahre’s assets held |
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outside Norway. |
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The main subject-matter of the action is, accordingly, whether the |
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transfer of the shares in Continental Trust Co. Inc. to the Continental |
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Foundation represented a genuine transfer or whether the transfer was a |
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pro forma one and with subsequent negligence on the part of the |
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defendants in relation to the supervisory obligations which Anders Jahre’s |
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estate alleges that the defendants had on Anders Jahre’s behalf. |
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To complete the background, it should be noted that the Continental |
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Foundation was relocated as a Cayman trust pursuant to cl. 29 of its deed |
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of settlement and subsequently its assets were transferred to and settled |
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upon the trust of the Aall Foundation, another Cayman trust. Although it |
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has been conceded that the Aall Foundation is validly constituted, the |
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estate of Anders Jahre maintains a claim to the assets on the basis that |
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they are held by the Aall Foundation upon constructive or resulting trust |
30 |
for the estate. |
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Objections to the request |
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The request attaches lists of questions approved by the Drammen court |
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by agreement of the parties joined in the action before it. It has been |
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conceded on behalf of Mr. Slatter that it is appropriate for an order to be |
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made for him to be deposed, subject to certain limitations advanced in |
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submissions on his behalf. Mr. Helfrecht has agreed to answer the |
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questions as listed, to the limited extent of his knowledge acquired as |
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Crown Counsel representing the Attorney General in earlier proceedings |
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before this court relating to the validity of the Continental and Aall |
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Foundation. |
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The concession on behalf of Mr. Slatter was, however, made subject to |
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certain objections raised by Mr. Foster in relation to some of the specific |
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questions listed. These relate to the breadth and lack of specificity of |
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some of the questions and to their speculative or “fishing” nature. I will |
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refer to these as the immediate objections. A further objection has been |
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taken by Mr. Foster on behalf of the trustees of the Aall Foundation |
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which raises issues of public policy. Briefly stated, this latter objection is |
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that as the evidence to be given by Mr. Slatter is intended for use in the |
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proceedings in Norway in which, it is alleged, evidence obtained illegally |
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contrary to the Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law (“the |
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Law”) has been used, this court should not allow the request. |
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I need not go into the circumstances of that objection or the allegation |
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upon which it is based, as it is not to be resolved in the context of the |
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present proceedings which are properly brought within the Evidence |
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(Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) (Cayman Islands) Order 1978 (“the |
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Evidence Order”). I confine my present concerns to the requirements of |
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the Evidence Order, which extended to the Cayman Islands the provisions |
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of the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975 with |
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modifications. That Act, in turn, gave effect to the Convention on the |
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Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, the Hague |
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Convention under which the request is made. |
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The public policy objection, if advanced, must be advanced instead in |
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the context of proceedings to be brought under s.4 of the Law in which |
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the Attorney General will be allowed, as amicus curiae, to present his |
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views in the public interest. This will all be subject also to whether this |
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court can ever establish that the abuse complained of did take place. The |
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estate of Anders Jahre, on behalf of which, it is alleged, the illegally |
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obtained evidence was adduced in the Norwegian proceedings, has |
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denied the allegations. |
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The immediate objections are, by contrast, easily understood and their |
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merits virtually self-evident from the face of the questions themselves. |
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Fortunately, they are also amenable to resolution by means of the “blue |
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pencil” approach, so that I can uphold those objections which I consider |
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to be valid while granting the request in substance. This can be done by |
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redacting the offending references and by clarification in as few words as |
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necessary, so as to ensure that there is no rewriting of the request in |
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substance. This case comfortably falls within the ambit of the dicta in the |
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decided cases to the effect that the court has the power to allow or |
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disallow a request in whole or in part provided that it does not embark |
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upon a process of so restructuring, recasting or rephrasing the request that |
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it becomes different in substance from the original request: see, e.g. |
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Voluntary Purchasing Group Inc. v. Insurco Intl. Ltd. (2) (1994–95 CILR |
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at 98). |
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Some questions will give rise to the production of documents in the |
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course of Mr. Slatter’s responses and so must with sufficient particularity |
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signify the documents so as to enable him to identify them in advance. |
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“Topic 10” in the request is an example of this. It requires the production |
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of minutes of board meetings, some specified, others only alluded to, in |
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“topic 9.” To meet the standards of particularization required by s.2(4) of |
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the Schedule to the Evidence Order, topic 10 will be narrowed to require |
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only the production of the minutes of the meetings on the dates specified. |
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The question in the first part of topic 9 is plainly impermissible |
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because it would require the improbable recollection of discussions some |
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12 years ago only from the witness’s memory. Topics 19 and 20 are |
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admittedly irrelevant as they are not referred to in the Norwegian |
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proceedings. |
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As for the “fishing” objections, I find that these too are largely borne |
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out by Mr. Foster’s submissions. A most obvious example of the |
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speculative or fishing nature of the questions objected to is in topic 11. |
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There, in the context of probing the disputed charitable nature of the |
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trusts of the Continental Foundation, not only do the questions concern |
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what, if any, charitable donations were made by the Continental |
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Foundation, but also what, if any, other charitable activities or activities |
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of any kind were carried out. In the absence of the pleadings filed in the |
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Drammen proceedings, I would not be able conclusively to decide upon |
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the relevance of this question in that context. |
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None the less, it remains a matter for this court to be satisfied whether |
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the legal requirements of the Evidence Order and of the Convention are |
20 |
met. The objection here is that the questions are framed so as not, in and |
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of themselves, to elicit evidence for use in the Drammen proceedings, but |
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for the purpose only of putting in train a possible line of enquiry which |
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might lead to such evidence. I am persuaded, on the preponderance of |
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authority, that even in the context of a request for testimony, this is |
25 |
impermissible “fishing”: see First American Corp. v. Zayed (1) for a |
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discussion of the principles which I apply here as requiring the |
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curtailment of questions which carry this potential for abuse. |
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The point can be stated in summary: There appears to be no reason in |
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principle for confining an objection to “fishing” only to requests seeking |
30 |
the production of documentary evidence and not to requests, such as the |
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present, which seek viva voce testimonial evidence. As we have seen |
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here, questions can just as readily be framed to elicit exploratory or |
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“fishing” responses as can requests for documents which are not |
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sufficiently particularized, intended not directly to adduce evidence but |
35 |
hoping to open up avenues of exploration leading to evidence. |
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Cross-examination |
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During the arguments, the issue emerged whether counsel would be |
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allowed to put further questions to Mr. Slatter by way of follow-up to |
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answers he might give to the questions listed. I ruled that no such cross- |
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examination would be allowed. None the less, I now see before me, in |
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Mr. McLaughlin’s written submissions on behalf of the estate of Anders |
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Jahre, reference to a statement issued by the Drammen court addressed to |
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this court purportedly in clarification of the request and to the effect that |
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both examination and cross-examination of Mr. Slatter should take place |
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and that the counsel for the parties should be allowed to conduct the |
|
examination. |
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This “clarification” was issued by the Drammen court after my earlier |
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ruling in which I also expressed the view that there was no need to revert |
5 |
to the Drammen court on that issue, as it was clear to this court what the |
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ambit of the questioning must be. The ambit was clear primarily from the |
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face of the request itself which states on page 1 (signed by the Norwegian |
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judge): “Attached to the individual letters of request are separate |
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interrogatories which contain the sum of the questions the parties wish to |
10 |
have put to the witnesses concerned. The interrogatories are formulated in |
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English.” There was no reference in the request to the need for cross- |
|
examination. |
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When those factors were taken against the background of the listed |
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questions having been prepared and agreed by the parties as representing |
15 |
their respective needs for examination of the witnesses, cross-examination |
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seemed neither necessary nor appropriate. In these circumstances, I am |
|
unable to accede to the subsequent “clarification” from the Norwegian |
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court over the objection of Mr. Slatter and of the other parties represented |
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by Mr. Foster. Cross-examination at the discretion of the counsel for the |
20 |
parties could become as open-ended and as protracted as each deems |
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necessary and would quite fundamentally recast the ambit of the request. |
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That would be unfair to the witnesses, who are entitled to some prior |
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understanding of the ambit of the questions to be put. |
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The court is also obliged to circumscribe the ambit of the request |
25 |
which it allows, for the purpose, amongst others, of guiding the witnesses |
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as to the extent to which they might disclose confidential information. |
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This is although, in appropriate cases, it can allow cross-examination |
|
pursuant to the Grand Court Rules, O.39, r.8(1). |
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There is a further important reason. The request from the Drammen |
30 |
court takes the form of listed questions to be put to the witnesses. This list |
|
defines the nature of the request for the purposes of art. 3(f) of the |
|
Convention which provides: |
|
“A Letter of Request shall specify— |
|
. . . |
35 |
(f) the questions to be put to the persons to be examined or a |
|
statement of the subject-matter about which they are to be |
|
examined.” [Emphasis supplied.] |
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There is an election to be made under the Convention (see the First |
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American Corp. case (1) (2000 CILR at 73–74) and it seems to me that the |
40 |
Drammen court has elected the listing format. The “clarification” inviting |
|
this court to allow cross-examination suggests that the questioning is no |
|
longer to be confined within the bounds of that election but should be |
|
allowed as if the request were based on the subject-matter format |
|
mentioned in art. 3(f) of the Convention. Such a fundamental change |
45 |
should require that the requesting court submits a different request. |